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posed until the commencement of the action and any action based on
past care furnished must fail.12
As the above discussion precludes the possibility of state recovery
for past care of indigent incompetents, it is appropriate now to consider
the course of action provided by statute 3 to which the state is limited
and in which the responsible family members, consisting of the father,
mother, husband, wife and children of the dependent, shall have their
liability fixed. The authorities having charge of the dependent person
or the board in charge of the institution where the dependent person
may be, must apply to the county judge of the county in which the de-
pendent person resides for an order to compel maintenance and must
serve a notice of such application upon the responsible family members
at least ten (10) days before a hearing which the county judge must
hold to hear the allegations and proofs in the matter. The county judge
will then, by order, require maintenance from such relatives, if they be
of sufficient ability, in the following order: first the husband or wife;
then the father; then the children; and lastly the mother. The order
will fix a weekly or monthly sum sufficient for the support of the de-
pendent to be paid for a fixed period or until further order of the court.
In the event that any responsible relative is unable wholly to maintain
the dependent, but is able to contribute to such support, the judge may
order two or more responsible relatives to maintain the dependent and
specify the amount each shall contribute. If it be established that the
responsible relatives are unable to wholly maintain the dependent but
are able to contribute to such maintenance, the judge shall order a sum
to be paid weekly or monthly by each relative in proportion to his abil-
ity. These orders may be enforced by proceedings as for contempt.
Also, the state is safe in furnishing maintenance once the order has
been made because the statute authorizes suit against any person dis-
obeying such an order and recovery in the amount prescribed by the
order. ELWIN J. ZARWELL
Taxation - Requirement that an Ordinary and Necessary Business
Expense Must Be Reasonable - Taxpayer, a manufacturing corporation,
deducted premiums paid on an employees' retirement annuity policy
and contributions to a trust fund for employees' benefit from its gross
income for 1940 and 1941 as an ordinary and necessary business ex-
pense.' The Tax Court disallowed this deduction ruling that the pay-
12 Guardianship of Heck, 225 Wis. 636, 275 N.W. 520 (1937).
13 Supra note 5.
1 Sec. 23 (a) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code. It was conceded that the
payments were not qualified for deduction under Sec. 23 (p) as then in effect
which allowed deductions for payments to pension and other plans under
certain conditions.
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ments were neither compensation for services actually rendered, nor
an ordinary and necessary business expense.2 The Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded on the sole ground that these payments
constituted an ordinary and necessary business expense, passing over
the compensation issue.3 The Tax Court ruled on remand that under
the Circuit Court opinion the payments were deductible as an ordinary
and necessary business expense regardless of whether they were reason-
able.4 The Commissioner appealed, contending that reasonableness of
amount must be considered. Held: Reversed and remanded. While
there is no express statutory provision limiting ordinary and necessary
expenses to a reasonable amount, yet ". . . the element of reasonableness
is inherent in the phrase 'ordinary and necessary.' Clearly it was not
the intention of Congress to automatically allow as deductions operating
expenses . . . in an unlimited amount." The prior opinion dealt only
with the nature and character of the payments, not with their amounts.
Commissioner v. The Lincoln Electric Company, 176 F.(2d) 815
(C.C.A. 6th, 1949); cert. den., 94 L.Ed. 372 (1950).
The Court in its decision is apparently seeking two ends, to allow a
deduction for payments which failed to qualify under Sec. 23 (p) or
as compensation, and at the same time to limit the amount of the de-
duction. To accomplish these ends, it was necessary to bridge a statu-
tory gap by injecting the reasonable amount test, found only in the
compensation clause, into the general expense provision. The decision
will have only limited effect on payments to pension and retirement
plans set up since 1942 because Sec. 23 (p) has been amended5 and
2 Commissioner v. The Lincoln Electric Company, 6 T.C. 37 (1944). Taxpayer's
primary contention that the payments constituted compensation was rejected
because it was not "paid to employees" and the benefits conferred were nebu-
lous and uncertain; the secondary contention that they were ordinary and
necessary expenses was rejected on the ground that they were not necessary
because the end sought existed prior to the expenditure, and not ordinary
expenses but more in the nature of capital expenditures.
3 Commissioner v. The Lincoln Electric Company, 162 F. (2d) 379, 35 AFTR
1470 (C.C.A. 6th, 1947). The Court held they were necessary because they
had in fact benefited taxpayer's business and were ordinary because not unique
in that business, and said that "If . . . they constitute such expenses it will
not become necessary to consider whether they are allowable deductions be-
cause they constitute compensation ......
4 Commissioner v. The Lincoln Electric Company, 8 T.C.M. Dec. 16, 136 (CCH,
1947).
5 The general rule of Sec. 23 (p), as amended by the Revenue Act of 1942, now
reads as follows: "If contributions are paid by an employer to or under a
. . . pension . . . or annuity plan, or if compensation is paid or accrued on
account of any employee under a plan deferring the receipt of such com-
pensation, such contributions or compensation shall not be deductible under
subsection (a) but shall be deductible, if deductible under subsection (a)
without regard to this subsection, under this subsection but only to the fol-
lowing extent.. . ." .The section does not apply to a plan that does not defer
receipt of compensation, but if the section does apply, the contributions are
deductible only to the extent that they are ordinary and necessary expenses
and are reasonable compensation. Treas. Reg. 111, Sec. 29.23 (p)-l. Tavannes
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the Tax Court has refused to allow a deduction as an ordinary and
necessary expense.' Whether the decision in its broad construction will
be applied to all ordinary and necessary expenses7 depends on the logic
of its position and more particularly on its practical consequences in
tax controversies. The decision opens the expense accounts of tax-
payers to scrutiny on an issue formerly reserved to compensation cases s
and is certainly a valuable bargaining factor for the Commissioner.
Both the desirability and logic of such a position is open to serious
question.
The language of the Code section9 under which the deduction was
taken appears to be clear and free of ambiguity; the first clause con-
tains the general rule and the specific expenses following are enum-
erated only because such expenses are further limited or defined. For
example, compensation is an ordinary and necessary business expense,"
but to be deductible, it must meet the further requirements that it be
reasonable and for personal services actually rendered."' It should fol-
Watch Company v. Commissioner, 176 F.(2d) 211 (C.C.A. 2d, 1949) (Pay-
ments made to employees' profit sharing plan after 1942 can be deducted under
Sec. 23 (p) only, and not under Sec. 23 (a).). Accord: Times Publishing
Company v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 329 (1949).
6Where the deduction had been allowed under Sec. 23 (a) prior to 1942, it
had usually been as compensation. See Alvin Glen Hall v. Commissioner, 7
T.C. 1220 (1946); Surface Combustion Corporation et.al., v. Commissioner,
9 T.C. 631 (1947) ; Roberts Filter Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 26 (1948)(Since the payments did not constitute compensation, a deduction was not
allowed under the general provision. The Court expressly refused to follow
the first Circuit Court opinion in the Lincoln case, supra, note 3.).
7Treas. Reg. 111, 29.23 (a)-2 requires that traveling expenses be reasonable.
In Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 66 S.Ct. 250 (1946), the Court said
that this regulation interpreted prior and successive revenue acts and there-
fore is impliedly approved by Congress and has the force of law. The Court
in the present case cites the Flowers case as precedent for its decision.S Immerman v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1030 (1946). (The Code does not limit
deductions for rental payments to a reasonable amount as in the case of
compensation; the amount of the payment does not affect the deduction.).
9I.R.C. Sec. 23. DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS INCOME.
In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
(a) Expenses.-
(1) Trade or business expenses.-
(A) In General.-All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or in-
curred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including
a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal serv-
ices actually rendered; traveling expenses (including the entire amount ex-
pended for meals and lodging) while away from home in the pursuit of a
trade or business; and rentals or other payments required to be made as a
condition to the continued use or possession for purposes of the trade or
business, or property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking
title or in which he has no equity.
10 Treas. Reg. 111, Sec. 29.23 (a)-1, (a)-6.
11 But see Griswold, Erwin N., New Light on "Reasonable Allowance For Sal-
aries."-, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 286 (1945), contending that the reasonable com-
pensation provision was not intended to be restrictive, but was intended to
allow a deduction to closely held corporations and individually owned busi-
nesses for salaries where none in fact had been paid, for purposes of computa-
tion of excess profits tax under the act of October 3, 1913.
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low logically that Congress intended the further limitations to apply
only to the particular expense to which they relate.
The premises of the present decision are unclear. The Court may
be adding the word "reasonable" to the statutory words "ordinary and
necessary," but since there is no authority existing in a judicial body
to revise legislation, the decision must be taken as construing the pre-
sent language of the statute. Two possible approaches suggest them-
selves. First, reasonableness of amount is part of and "inherent in
the phrase 'ordinary and necessary.'" The difficulty presented by such
an interpretation is that the phrase refers to the kind of expenses that
will be deductible and not to the amount of payments. The leading
case of Welch v. Helvering= defined a necessary expense as one ap-
propriate and helpful to the development of the taxpayer's business,
and an ordinary expense as one not unique in the life of the group or
community.13 The origin and nature of the expense determines its de-
ductibility under Sec. 23 (a).14 While there is no hard and fast rule
as to what expenses are ordinary and necessary, the principles and
standards used in the cases seem to exclude the idea of reasonableness
of amount as a part of the phrase "ordinary and necessary," or the
idea that the amount of an expense is a criterion of whether it is or-
dinary and necessary.' 5 On the other hand, the court may be saying
that a disbursement, unreasonable in amount, is not an "expense in
carrying on a trade or business." Such interpretation is consistent with
the cases relied upon as precedent by the Court, but is certainly incon-
sistent with the language and tenor of its opinion. The Botany case 6
was a decision on the deductibility of compensation payments and con-
strued Sec. 12 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1916 which contained the
general rule of Sec. 23 (a) without the present provision for reasonable
12 190 U.S. 111 (1933) (While it may be helpful, and therefore necessary, to
taxpayer's business with his former employer's customers that he satisfy the
bankrupt employer's obligations to such customers, it is not usual, and there-
fore not ordinary, to pay another's debts.). The Court in the first appeal of
the Lincoln case, supra, note 3, used the definitions in the Welch case in
reaching its decision.
13 Stanley and Kilcullen, The Federal Income Tax (1948), p. 54 C"...what is
ordinary and necessary depends on the type of business . . .and the business
customs of the time and in the locality. . . . It is not necessary that the ex-
penses be ordinary in that it is frequently made by the taxpayer. ..
Deputy v. Du Pont, 302 U.S. 488 (1939).
" Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1942) ; Kornhauser v.
U.S., 276 U.S. 145 (1928) (Where a suit against a taxpayer is directly con-
nected with, or proximately resulted from his business, attorney fees are de-
ductible expenses because a suit ordinarily and decessarily requires the use
of counsel.).
15 For language indicating that it is a criterion, see Commissioner v. Heininger,
320 U.S. 467, 64 S.Ct. 249 (1943); L. 0. 1045, C.B. Dec. 133 (1920); 47 C.J.S.
254, Sec. (c) (1946) (The case cited as authority, however, National Cotton-
seed Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 76 F.(2d) 839 (C.C.A. 6th, 1935) treated
the payments as additional compensation.).
:6 Botany Worsted Mills v. U.S., 278 U.S. 282, 49 S.Ct. 129 (1929).
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compensation. There the Court found it unnecessary to determine
whether unreasonable compensation is an ordinary and necessary ex-
pense, but decided that an "extravagant" and "extraordinary" amount,
having no relation to the services rendered, is not in reality payment
for services. The Limericks case 17 decided that unreasonable rental
paid by a corporation to its principal stockholder was in fact a dis-
tribution of net profits and ". . . in no sense a legitimate business ex-
pense." These cases permit a scrutiny of the nature of the expense if
there is a question of whether the payment is another form of disburse-
ment in the guise of a business expense, but are not authority for the
position that legitimate business expenses can be disallowed because
the amount is excessive. In view of the Court's prior decision that
the payments were ordinary and necessary business expenses, it is
difficult to see the applicability of these decisions.18
The more reasonable interpretation of the statute is that Congress
did not intend that a businessman's judgment as to the amount he
should pay in incurring a business expense should be open to question,
nor that he should be penalized for making a bad bargain. The au-
thority of the Commissioner to question the reasonableness of amounts
paid as compensation has been seriously questioned.19 A decision where
authority to question the amounts of all business expenses is found in
the Commissioner by inference and analogy is certainly open to doubt.
In compensation cases, the elements of close relation between expender
and recipient" and control by the recipient2 ' can be used to disallow
the deduction on the ground that the payment is not in fact compen-
sation. Therefore, it would seem that in the field of general expenses,
the Commissioner is adequately protected against excessive payments
on the issue of business expense and there is no reason to extend to
general expenses the additional power that he has assumed in the com-
pensation cases. KENNETH H. HAYES
"1 Limericks Inc. v. Commissioner, 162 F.(2d) 483 (C.C.A. 5th, 1949).
15 The Court in the present case explained that since the issue in the prior case
was a question of law, i.e., the nature of payments to pension plans as con-
forming to the requirements of the statute, any question of fact is left open,
and whether the amounts paid are reasonable is a question of fact. Query as
to whether the only question of fact open is whether the disbursements were
payments to a pension plan, and if so, is not the statute satisfied and the
amount immaterial? The dissent felt the issue had been finally determined
and viewed the decision as an unauthorized rehearing of the prior decision.
19 See Griswold, Erwin N., The Deduction of "A Reasonable Allowance For Sal-
aries"-The Undefined Power of the Commissioner, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 947
(1943) contending that the only instances where the amount of compensation
should be open to question are: 1) payments made to stockholders where
they are in effect a dividend; 2) payments which are in substance gifts. See
also Griswold's subsequent article, supra, note 11. His theory is that the only
question is whether the payments are compensation, and if they are compen-
sation, the reasonableness of their amount is not open to scrutiny.
20Lydia Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Commissioner, 128 F. (2d) 986 (C.C.A. 1st,
1942).
22 Supra, note 16.
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